INDIGENOUS TERRITORIALITIES IN MEXICO AND COLOMBIA

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 "What does it mean, at the end of the twentieth century, to speak of a 'native land'?" –James Clifford, quoted in Gupta and Ferguson 1992

 "The many displaced, deterritorialized, and transient populations that constitute today's ethnoscapes are engaged in the construction of locality, as a structure of feeling, often in the face of the erosion, dispersal, and implosion of neighborhoods as coherent social formations. This disjuncture between neighborhoods as social formations and locality as a property of social life is not without historical precedent, given that long-distance trade, forced migrations, and political exits are very widespread in the historical record. What is new is the disjuncture between these processes and the mass-mediated discourses and practices (including those of economic liberalization, multiculturalism, human rights, and refugee claims) that now surround the nation-state". –Arjun Appadurai 1996:199

1. INTRODUCTION

What is indigenous territoriality in an increasingly deterritorialized world? What is the relationship between "locality" and "neighborhood" when Latin American native peoples' lives are transformed by migration and war? What about the relationship between historical memory, discourse, ceremonial and economic practice, militancy and the law for Indians trying to (re-)claim land and rights? With the ongoing devolution if not outright dissolution of state power in Latin America and elsewhere, the significance of "regional worlds" and particularly of indigenous territoriality grows. But even though indigenous territoriality is shaped by flows of people, things and discourses within (and between) regional worlds and often defined against the discourses and boundaries of the state, it is also partly defined within states, particularly in the case of *indigenismo* (see section 2.1).[2] And Indians are as likely to be engaged in "horizontal" struggles over land and power with each other as they are to be in vertical territorial contests with the state; this is particularly evident in the literature discussed below on

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[2] Much recent literature has shown how local territoriality and productive regimes are both linked and opposed to the state and to forces operating beyond national territories over time. For instance, Nugent (1993) analyzed the relationship between the state and Namiquipa, Chihuahua, a northern frontier colony originally granted vast communal lands by the Spanish crown in exchange for fighting the marauding native peoples ("Apaches") of the region. First allied with the colonial state against indigenous people in the 18th century, Namiquipa became one of the first communities in Mexico to rise up against the Liberal state in the 1910 revolution—now allying itself with indigenous struggles insofar as Indians' communal lands were at stake, too. But later, when the Revolution betrayed its peasant base and undermined the land-based productive strategies that had always been the community's *raison d'etre,* the allegiances changed again. Hence the relationship between local territory and the surrounding ethnic and economic climate, the distant state and the international context "zig-zags" in historical perspective. However, this discussion did not venture very far into the cultural meanings of territory, warfare and subsistence practices (but see Alonso 1995). In all, to fully understand territoriality, one needs to look at how state policies and global commodity and information flows both mediate and are constrained by local ecological relationships and social practices from the actors' perspectives—no small challenge.

Oaxaca (section 2.3)—where there is virtually no one *but* Indians to compete with. This essay surveys part of the extensive recent literature that addresses these complex issues, with an eye toward assembling a more encompassing theoretical framework for understanding indigenous territoriality in Latin America.

1.1 Organization of the essay
In the following sections, I first briefly explore the notion of territoriality and explain the essay's dual areal focus. Next I examine at greater length anthropological and administrative approaches to territoriality in 20th century Mexico (expanding on a literature review by De la Peña 1999). The discussion then focuses on indigenous territoriality and autonomy in Mexico's most indigenous state, Oaxaca. I also touch on the Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional (EZLN) enclave in the neighboring state of Chiapas, even though the territorial scheme there is still largely discursive and only partially reflects the programs of other *campesinista* (peasant economic) and *indianista* (indigenous cultural) groups (Van Cott 1996: http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair53/m53c3.html). Next I point out how territoriality in the thinly populated but notably traditional Gran Nayar region of western Mexico contrasts with the more densely populated, politically problematic indigenous regions of southern Mexico. Like elsewhere in Mexico, in the Gran Nayar new indigenous authorities allied with social movements and non-governmental organizations are increasingly tying *comunidades* and *ejidos* together on a regional basis in order to claim territory and redefine development. But more strikingly, everyday people who have been carrying out territorially extensive ritual practices far beyond the limits of their *comunidades* and *ejidos* for centuries are now tying those practices into political demands as well. Finally we move to a compact summary of work on Colombia (particularly the Cauca valley), where discursive constructions of territoriality are most detailed and have been put into practice for some years now. All over the planet the emergence of multiple indigenous territorialit*ies* challenges Max Weber's (1925) notion of the state as a legitimated order of domination (*Herrschaft*) in a national territorial space, but the notion is especially problematic in Colombia.

1.2 Elements of territoriality
Territoriality has become an exceedingly diffused term in the expanding discussions about indigenous regions of the western hemisphere (to say nothing of globalization in general). The main territorial regimes discussed here are the expanding *resguardo* and *reserva* system in Colombia and the *comunidades indígenas* and *ejidos* of Mexico.[3] This essay seeks to connect some of these regimes' diverse elements: land tenure, land use (including ritual), other kinds of production and exchange, political claims and cultural identity. However, no single conceptual grid encompasses all the roughly 200 studies cited; instead, you can situate the different territorial schemes summarized here according to various sets of contrasts: state vs. indigenous, global vs. regional vs. local, objective geographical vs. subject-centered, political vs. economic vs. cultural, practice-based vs. discursive. In any case, the experience and social production of territory as a personally experienced, politicized set of places is what this essay means by *territoriality*. As such it is a higher-order, historically and culturally variable artifact of

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[3] *Resguardos* are comparable to Mexican *comunidades indígenas* as the inheritors of a colonial if not prehispanic legacy of corporate landholding, whereas *reservas* as more recent government grants may be compared to *ejidos* in some cases.

human consciousness. It *emerges from* a wide range of land use and other productive, ritual and political practices (especially indigenous identity discourses) as national and international legal changes increasingly recognize them. That is, territoriality is formed in people's understanding of material practices and institutional frameworks in space and time instead of being automatically *given by* them (*cf.* Marx 1976[1851], a foundational theory of the relation between ecology, labor and consciousness).

Most American indigenous peoples have stressed their essentially continuous, historically deep territorial identities even though these may be inflected by centuries of ethnocide, land loss and displacement due to the state, church and market forces. In Latin America, indigenous communities are often defined by traditional corporate institutions (*cargos*) and colonial land titles, which in turn often recognized prehispanic occupation (but see section 2.2 for the impact of deterritorialization on this conception of identity, and section 2.3 for Article 4 and Convention 169's definition of "*indígenas*" in terms of historical practices).[4] Also, Indians still frequently root their identities in culturally significant material transformations of place such as hunting, gathering, craft and horticultural practices, even though they now may live at greater distances from their home-lands for long stretches of time or can only *represent* those material transformations in literature, "ethnic art" or other media. See Pacheco (1993) for a nostalgic literary example of landscape in Huichol indigenous cultural memory. Also, Amith (1995) describes the centrality of ecological relationships to the ethnic, territorial and historical consciousness that Nahuas express in the *amate* paintings they produced in the early 1990s as part of their struggle against hydroelectric development on the upper Balsas River in Guerrero, Mexico.

Lest this seem like a drift into a purely discursive territoriality, a caveat: as far as this essay is concerned, indigenous territoriality is not just any identification by anyone with any place. Instead, the minimal condition for a territorial relationship is people's active, simultaneously material and symbolic reproduction of an indigenous "neighborhood" even when they find themselves constructing "localities" elsewhere (see Appadurai epigram). I hasten to add that such material and symbolic practice does not need to be fully elaborated in an ideological discourse but no discursive definition of indigenous identity (*e.g.,* Gow & Rappaport 2000:3) is effective without such practices. Or as Rodman's review on the production of locality put it, "places come into being through praxis, not just through narratives" (1992:642).

Praxis and narrative are especially linked at the level of emergent ethnic territories: "The act of narrating expands the spatial and temporal dimensions of the village outwards into a wider landscape, while simultaneously focusing these dimensions to the mutual co-presence of narrator and listener in this one place" (Gow 1995:53). And as the authors of a theoretically suggestive yet concretely policy-oriented work put it (in terms applicable to other geographically extensive Native American people; see section 2.4),

> The landscape is a physical link between people of the present and their past. The landscapes and the stories that go with them depend on each other.…places with stories, being part of the land-based life, are integrated into larger, living

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[4] Describing the vast range of definitions for "indigenous" would require a Venn diagram composed of three partially overlapping circles marked "autochthonous blood", "communal participation", and "cultural identity" whose relative sizes have varied over time and space, with "identity" currently expanding.

landscapes, just as the stories that go with each place are integrated into larger, living narratives. …disturbance of these landscapes will speed the loss of Navajo stories and culture, which many feel is imminent under the weight of "economic development". The stories and the land are not only powerful symbols, but also constituents, of Navajo ethnicity (Kelley and Francis 1994:2, 188).

And to signal a third article that addresses this verbal and physical articulation of places and history into territory, Rodman uses her "multivocal" view of place to build a "multilocal" model of territory: "regional relationships between *lived spaces* are developed through infusing experience in one place with the evocation of other events and other places" (1992:644). This observation expands on Tilley's: "Places are always 'read' or understood in relation to others" (1994:27).

In short, one major theoretical challenge is to reconcile traditional structural notions of geographical region, land tenure and land use with people's phenomenological "implacement" and increasingly eclectic appropriations of global practices and discourses. These two sets of concerns correspond to what Entrikin (1991:3) in a widely cited work calls "decentered" and "centered", respectively (*cf.* Lefebvre's distinction between the objective "basis of action" and the actor's indexical "field of action" 1991:191, cited in Munn 1996).

Having said that, the broad range of approaches entailed in the term "territoriality" precludes a detailed discussion of the voluminous literature on land tenure and land use, particularly the maize agriculture on which Mesoamerican indigenous territoriality usually rests.[5] For instance, the opening lines of Eckart Boege's book on regional contradictions in Mazatec economy and society echo Marx's German Ideology by reminding us that production remains the fundamental means of creating territoriality:

According to the elder Ramos, to be *shuta enima* ["humble person"; *i.e.,* a Mazatec] entails working in the bush [*el monte*]. I would like to emphasize the problem of what labor means for the creation of identity. We are dealing with the transformation of nature—*el monte*—with human action… The notion "we work"…has the village or villages behind it. In effect, work strategies are based in the first instance on the organization of the community — but also on the experience which emerges through work in *el monte* as well as collective knowledge, the transmission of management of particular ecosystems, the means of approaching nature.…Sharing this knowledge unifies the mountain [Mazatec] groups; planting the cornfield in a particular place ties the peasant to the nature that surrounds him. Maize with its associated crops generates the culture we are going to analyze in this work.…With the above only the group identity of a village or small *municipio* would be explained. However, the regional exchange

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[5] See these classic works on Mexican land tenure, the *ejido* and local political structure, respectively: McBride 1923; Simpson 1937; Whetten 1948. For indices of primary texts, see the *Boletín del Archivo General Agrario* and the *Colección Agraria,* from the agrarian archives of the Archivo General de la Nación, edited by Teresa Rojas Rabiela and Antonio Escobar Ohmstede of the Centro de Investigaciones y Estudios Superiores en Antropología Social at http://www.ciesas.edu.mx/bibdf/. It includes Cuadras Caldas 1999 for a classical revolutionary statement; Escobar Ohmstede *et al.* 1998; Embriz and Ruiz 1998; Olmedo 1998; Galván Rivera 1999; Embriz and Ruiz 1999; Various Authors 1999, etc.

of goods produced according to community specializations (aside from the production of maize) brings us to forms of interaction between communities that reinforce the interdependence of "us" (Boege 1988: 26-27, PL's trans.).

The intimate connections between production, social organization and territoriality could not be clearer (Boege 1988:37,62; *cf.* Palerm 1972[1955], in Netting 1993:264 for the relationship between maize production techniques, ecology and population). Or as an article on western Amazonia by a theorist of Colombian indigenous territoriality succinctly phrased it, the cultural landscape is "predicated on the active work of men and women…as a temporal process" (Gow 1995:49-50).

More precisely, access to the rural means of production and to political power largely determines the character of people's territorial identification. The classic forms of "access to the rural means of production" among peasant-workers in Mexico are as collective *comuneros* or *ejidatarios*, individual *propietarios*, dependent *peones acasillados* or *medieros* (sharecroppers), proletarian *jornaleros*, or – more indirectly – as migrants outside their home region or as refugees displaced by hydroelectric development, biosphere reserves, wars, etc.[6] And "access to political power" ranges from the disenfranchisement of Indians living without representation in mestizo-controlled *municipios* or as undocumented workers in California to armed insurgents (re-)appropriating lands from private estates, members of recently established autonomous indigenous *municipios*, and corrupt *caciques* (political bosses), etc.

Indeed, the so-called "multivocality" of place cited above (Rodman 1992) is largely expressed through the diverse forms of access to the means of production as well as through age, gender and class more broadly conceived. Stereotypical gender roles of course tended to make women more unilocal actors more identified with visceral cultural symbols (maize, rain, earth) and men more multilocal actors, but people constantly displace such symbols into new morally and spatially peripheral domains, occasioning profound contradictions in the process (Friedrich 1977). Jane Hill (1995) describes this symbolically charged cultural dialectic between (female) center and (male) periphery as a "moral geography" inflected by narrative structure and multiple cultural "voices": in her Bakhtinian analysis of a Mexicano (Nahuatl) political murder narrative, "we are in *monte* 'uncultivated land', and not a cultivated field, part of the peasant order of things. In this dreadful place a crowd of women, symbols of Mexicano tradition, try to keep Don Gabriel from the sight of his son's body…" (*ibid.:*112). Rodman suggests in general that multiple voices—both within an indigenous group and around it—must be taken into account to understand territory as a multiperspectival construction. Such a plural, linguistically and experientially-based perspective combines well with Lomnitz's (1998) observations, discussed in section 2, that multiple centers and peripheries are inscribed within local places with increasingly variegated class structures.

The issue of rural class structure and the sustainability of peasant production is most pressing in the current neoliberal phase that began when Mexican President

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[6] In southern Mexico, Miguel Bartolomé and Alicia Barabas have documented the ethnic reconfigurations and millenarian ideological responses of deterritorialized but historically antagonistic groups that found themselves sharing new lands after being displaced by hydroelectric development (Barabas & Bartolomé 1973; Bartolomé & Barabas 1990). The displacement or subordination of indigenous people by instituting biosphere reserves under outside control is a kindred threat, both in the Gran Nayar region discussed below as well as in Chiapas (Collier 1994a:49).

Miguel de la Madrid signed the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986: since then the state has severely weakened protectionist measures that shielded the rural sector from global market forces and the re-consolidation of large landholdings. Also, see Warman 1976 on the Mexican state's more gradual erosion of rural subsistence ever since the end of the revolution in order to subsidize urban development and Sanderson (1986) on the effects of export-oriented agricultural production up to the eve of GATT.

At the same time that one must look at rural production, the postmodern truism that culture or identity is "multilocal"—not grounded in a simple 1:1 relationship to a single place–requires any notion of "territoriality" to take migration and other forms of displacement from the "peasant mode of production" (as well as gender differences and household structure) into account. If not, territoriality is increasingly irrelevant because rooted unilocal territories are becoming increasingly problematic. Practically speaking, indigenous territoriality in Latin America is still largely concerned with the possession of demarcated pieces of the earth's surface. However, it is also about expanding rights and claims beyond those boundaries as people reframe local historical identities in terms of globalized autonomous development and human rights discourses. Sometimes this means that overlapping ceremonial, productive and discursive relationships to multiple places (and especially the cultural or political claims based on such relationships) contradict each other both within a locality and on a regional level.

Such a synthetic approach to defining territoriality brings seemingly incongruous practices like "maize horticulture", "cattle ranching", "drug production", "agrarian revolution", "labor migration", "forced relocation", "ethnic discourse" and "religious pilgrimage" within a common framework of literally *grounded* identity. In a very preliminary way, then, my goal is to examine the connections among forms of indigenous land use, land tenure, ceremonial and productive organization, local political power, regional political articulation, trans-regional migration and ethnic identity under different historical and structural conditions. This approach both extends and questions the particular meanings of the above list of incongruous practices by positioning them around the processual notion of the "production of locality", which extends beyond a given "neighborhood". Of course sociology has never assumed that a "community" has to be synonymous with a single place, but by focusing on discourse and practice, much of the literature discussed here takes the social construction of place and territory to be a central issue.

1.3 Why Mexico and Colombia?
This essay concentrates on Mexico but it also examines some recent work on Colombia, revealing a complex mixture of parallels and contrasts between the two countries.[7] That is, Mexico and Colombia are both multiethnic republics roughly comparable in terms of size (1.97 million vs. 1.14 million square kilometers), and since the 1980s both have carried out major constitutional expansions of indigenous communities' legal status along with other political changes. Most notably, in the early 1990s both governments signed the International Labor Organization's Convention 169 on the Rights of

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[7] Also see Van Cott (1996: http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair53/m53c2.html) for a crisp comparison of Colombia and Brazil, emphasizing the law and social movements. That chapter is part of a document for the US War College that also analyzes the emergence of the Chiapas Zapatistas (http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair53/m53c3.html) in ideological and organizational terms.

Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, among other measures enhancing indigenous autonomy in a post-modernizing period.[8] A broad, schematic comparison of many countries' basic constitutional provisions for indigenous peoples (as well as a complete, annotated text of Convention 169 as it bears on Mexico) is laid out in Gómez (1995).

The legal changes both reflect and enhance the recent transformation of *indígenas* as subjects of state development programs into *indios* as an emergent, autonomous ethnic movement (De la Peña 1995). Van Cott (*ibid.*) focuses on the fact that "the goal of the protagonists of the movement—the thousands of indigenous communities and organizations throughout the Americas—is the recuperation of local autonomy and the exercise of authority over traditional territories". However, the types and pace of legal recognition for indigenous peoples, the relative independence of indigenous movements from political parties and non-governmental organizations, as well as the concrete provisions for categorizing particular kinds of land and social practices as "indigenous" and "autonomous" reflect demographic and structural differences between Mexico and Colombia.

Among the structural conditions, the extent of globalization, neoliberal reforms and state vs. guerrilla or *narcotraficante* hegemony differs significantly: the reforms hit much harder in Mexico, whereas the crisis of hegemony–and violence—is more acute in Colombia.[9] Consequently, much of the Mexican ethnography reviewed here emphasizes how migration and other kinds of deterritorialization have affected indigenous identity. The Colombian literature points out the pivotal structural role of indigenous people whose organizations have emerged relatively intact from a civil war fought over natural resources, drug cultivation and sectional interests.

Still, Mexico has also had a history of rural violence: following the bloody national repression of 1968, the state of Guerrero had a brief insurgency in the late 70s, in Chiapas the EZLN movement incubated quietly in the early 80s and attacked the government in 1994, and smaller insurgencies have emerged in Guerrero and Oaxaca since then. However, the EZLN shocked nearly everyone because it erupted after a long period of relative calm in the countryside: the Mexican state is basically much more stable and in control of the national territory than its Colombian counterpart.

In general, then, Mexico has been the increasingly democratic stage for a spatially limited but politically far-reaching neo-indigenous rebellion since 1994 whereas Colombia, which has had the Quintín Lamé indigenous insurgency since as early as 1981, is a state with much less hegemony over its territory or economy. Indeed, it has been argued that basically neither the Colombian state nor the national or international private sectors have much interest in nearly half the national territory

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[8] In Convention 169, territory is defined as lands that indigenous people "traditionally occupy" and over which they should be granted "rights of property and possession". It also advocates the "right of those peoples to participate in the utilization and conservation of those resources" (Part II, Arts. 13, 14, 15). This theoretically transcends the category of "community land" defined in Article 27 of the Mexican constitution (cf. the Código Agrario, the revolutionary state's bible of land tenure). Indeed, this incipient legal framework recognizes that the "indigenous *pueblo*" is more than the local indigenous *community*, and its "traditional occupation of lands frequently includes pastoral and gathering activities as well as ceremonial uses of space" (De la Peña 1999:22; PL's trans.). Likewise, Convention 169 also recognizes the right of *pueblos* to govern themselves with their own authorities and legal systems provided they do not contradict "human rights or fundamental laws".

[9] Van Cott estimates that by the late 1990s, 400 Colombian indigenous leaders had been assassinated, either by the government and right-wing paramilitaries who assume that Indians cooperate with guerrillas, or by the guerrillas—particularly the FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia)—who assume otherwise.

(Gros 1991:322)![10]   In any event, civil war (which began in 1947) has virtually dismembered the country and promoted increasing social competition and ecological stress on lands exploited for their capacity to produce dizzying wealth from coca, opium or cannabis. By now, just lowering the level of opium cultivation is a bargaining chip that indigenous communities in the Cauca valley may use to negotiate greater land concessions and autonomy from the government (Arizama 1994:88; Gow 1997:276). The fact that indigenous people inhabit 20% of the national territory (albeit in a dispersed way) gives them a strategic political position, even though they number only 800,000 (a mere two percent of the population). In Mexico, 10 percent of the 100 million inhabitants consider themselves indigenous but they occupy a much smaller fraction of the territory and their role in drug cultivation is marginal and subordinate.

In short, as the Colombian state tried to keep territorially pivotal Indians from abandoning relations with it and going over more to guerrillas and/or drug growers, autonomous Indigenous Territorial Entities (Entidades Territoriales Indígenas, ETIs) were created in the amended 1991 Constitution.[11] However, much as in Mexico,

> it has been difficult to implement the territorial provisions…as secondary legislative procedures are required to distribute territorial entities and define their responsibilities. Indigenous organizations opposed the versions of the Organic Law the Gaviria and Samper administrations presented and are dissatisfied with the lack of input the organizations have been able to have in the creation of the implementing legislation (Betancourt & Rodríguez 1994: 22-23; on the constitutional reform, Departamento Nacional de Planeación 1992—both cited in Van Cott 1996).

That is, in Mexico indigenous people still await concrete enabling legislation for a vaguely worded amendment to Article 4 of the Constitution, and in part because their support is less pivotal to the state's survival, nothing like ETIs have yet been so mandated. As of this posting the new president, Vicente Fox Quesada, promises to finally resolve this ambiguity as well as the Chiapas conflict, but Article 4 has also been

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[10] Until 1974, much of the "national territory" was considered Catholic mission lands. State interests focus on the coffee and livestock areas in the center of the country, banana plantations in the north, and oilfields and rice production in the Andean piedmont. However, the lack of state presence does not imply a shortage of bloody local conflicts over resources (Gros 1991: 322-23) or of the increasingly regional "drug war".

[11] Probably the most important single measure is Article 286, which calls for the ETIs. Under it, "indigenous communities are granted a range of autonomous powers to define their own development strategies, choose their own authorities, and administer public resources, including local and national taxes" (Van Cott 1996). Avirama & Márquez (1994:103-105) summarize other articles of the 1991 constitution of special importance to indigenous people:

Title II, Chapter II
On Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights
    Article 63. [Contrast with the neoliberal amendment to Article 27 of the Mexican Constitution.]
    Article 68.
Title VIII, Chapter V
On the Special Jurisdictions
    Article 246.
    Title XI, Chapter IV
On the Special Regimes
Article 329. [Again, compare to Art. 27.]
Article 330.

criticized more fundamentally for privileging cultural over economic or human rights (Díaz Polanco 1995).   Still, for the first time since the colonial caste system was abolished in the early 19th century, the amended Article 4 recognizes the country's "ethnically pluralistic composition" ("*composición étnica plural*"). As such, it promises to "protect, preserve and promote the development" of indigenous communities' "languages, cultures, practices, customs and specific forms of social organization". Especially the latter seems to imply extensive territorial practices if not autonomy.

Finally, the timing of the culturally sensitive Mexican constitutional amendment makes one suspect its real purpose since it came amid the globalization of the economy under NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement or Tratado de Libre Comercio).   The measure is widely seen as endangering the small-scale rural subsistence and farming economy (Cornelius 1992; Hewitt de Alcántara 1994; Cornelius & Myhre 1998, frequently cited works from the Center for US-Mexican Studies, University of California, San Diego, an important general source on Mexican globalization issues; also Randall 1996 for a diverse collection). In particular, the Salinas government's simultaneous neoliberal amendment of Article 27 (the agrarian reform) clearly contradicted its tentative recognition of indigenous territoriality in Article 4. The amended Article 27 effectively dismantled the Secretaría de Reforma Agraria, cutting off new peasant land claims. This move culminated the dismantling of the revolutionary agrarian regime initiated when Salinas's predecessor, Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado, signed onto GATT in 1986 in order to increase capital investment in Mexico. http://www.ladas.com/BULLETINS/1994/NAFTAGATT.html lays out the intellectual property issues connected with these globalizing reforms.[12]

Now with Salinas's neoliberal constitutional amendment, as with the 19th century Liberal disentailment of community lands, the greater mobility of foreign capital in Mexico has made it far easier to mortgage or even sell *ejidos.* To a lesser degree it also potentially affects the older and usually far less capitalized and modernized *comunidades indígenas.*   This is a marked contrast to the Colombian expansion of communal lands through the 1990s. The gutting of Article 27 and the signing of NAFTA were key provocations for the EZLN uprising on the very day the treaty went into effect, January 1, 1994.

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[12] In Van Cott's succinct framework (1996), the link between globalization and indigenous land loss is clear: "In the 1980s a number of international trends had a broad impact on national politics in the region. The regionwide debt crisis forced most countries in the region to slash social spending in exchange for debt relief. The new model of economic development prescribed by lenders forced a transformation of the state, while opening protected and inefficient markets to international trade. For rural peoples, this new economic model meant the loss of agricultural subsidies, marketing assistance, and transfer payments, as well as increasing encroachments on Indian and peasant lands due to the expansion of the private sector. It is important, however, not to overstate the direct impact of neoliberal reforms during the 1980s on ethnic-based political activity, for three reasons: 1) Numerous indigenous organizations already existed at the time reforms were instituted. 2) While many incorporated an analysis of the impact of these reforms on the poor into their political rhetoric, the main focus of indigenous movements continued to be cultural revindication, dignity, autonomy, and land. 3) Most rural and Amazonian indigenous communities never received the public services-health care, potable water, electricity, sewerage, roads-that were cut as a result of the reforms. The key link between liberalizing reforms and indigenous mobilization is changes in land policies threatening communal land tenure. Efforts to privatize Indian lands result from a) Pressure from local elites to acquire this land; b) Reforms required of debtor nations by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank; c) Modernization of the agricultural sector in order to better compete on international markets and join free trade agreements."

Díaz Polanco (1991:203-206; 1995) in particular is highly critical and pessimistic about the prospects for indigenous territoriality under neoliberal constitutional reforms. For him, the only solution is regional autonomy:

> If community is the nucleus of ethnicity, threatening the former endangers the latter. In this sense, regional autonomy, inasmuch as it assumes not only the consolidation of the community but moreover the expansion of territoriality (and under new conditions including the updating of ancient regional territorialities, although not the same territories as before), is probably the last chance or historical option for the Indian peoples of Latin America (1995:239; PL's trans.).

In partial contrast, in Colombia there are international agreements between the government, the Organización Nacional Indígena de Colombia (ONIC, a centralized body founded in 1982 to coordinate the nation's dispersed indigenous populations) and the European Union to develop indigenous proposals for autonomous territories.

2. MEXICAN INDIGENOUS TERRITORIALITY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
 "Land, territorial autonomy, and the reassertion of indigenous identities coalesce in ways that
reemphasize the close intersections between the cultural and the geopolitical". –David Slater 1998:395

2.0 Center, periphery and locality
One of the most prominent global models of locality has been Arjun Appadurai's. He
outlines the multi-sited, recursive reproduction of "neighborhood" and "locality" in
global context, but at the risk of implying that such places initially exist without active,
extensive interrelations:

> Put summarily, as local subjects carry on the continuing task of reproducing their
> neighborhood, the contingencies of history, environment, and imagination
> contain the potential for new contexts (material, social, and imaginative) to be
> produced. In this way, through the vagaries of social action by local subjects,
> neighborhood as context produces the context of neighborhoods. Over time, this
> dialectic changes the conditions of the production of locality as such. Put
> another way, this is how the subjects of history become historical subjects, so that
> no human community, however apparently stable, static, bounded, or isolated,
> can usefully be regarded as cool or outside history…. In this new sort of world,
> the production of neighborhoods increasingly occurs under conditions where the
> system of nation-states is the normative hinge for the production of both local
> and translocal activities. …the power relations that affect the production of
> locality are fundamentally translocal… (Appadurai 1996:185, 187-88).

This leads to the question of how global and state forces interact with local or regional
indigenous territorialities and identities. Some of the more focused responses come
from recent historically based work in Mexico, even though this essay can only
generally indicate that literature's importance.

For instance, Frye (1996, esp. chapter 7, "Land, history, and identity") follows a
Tlaxcaltecan frontier settlement's long struggle against encroachment. Nugent (1993)
did a trenchant, land- and labor-based analysis of another former frontier colony's
struggle against Indians, land speculators and the state on an international frontier (see
ff. 2 above). Suffice it to say that precolumbian, colonial, national and revolutionary
states have been linked to territories and cultures in significantly different ways, and
those diverse historical configurations may remain inscribed in local territoriality. This
process is generally addressed in Claudio Lomnitz's scheme of national cultural
articulation (1992, esp. chapter 1, "Concepts for the study of regional culture", for
definitions of his five principal terms: intimate culture, culture of social relations,
localist ideology, coherence and *mestizaje*). However, here I discuss a later article (1998)
for its more specific analysis of the relationships between center and periphery in local
territories.

Since the project of socializing everyone as national subjects took off in the 19th
century, most of the once coherent territories (indigenous and otherwise) have now
collapsed under the modernizing demands of the state and market (*e.g.,* Warman 1976;
Greenberg 1989 to cite only the Morelos peasantry in general and the Chatinos of
Oaxaca in particular). However, according to Lomnitz, the post-colonial state's failure
to actually deliver the resources required to develop modernity has led most subjects to
doubt its legitimacy. So, he concludes, whereas in the prehispanic period *states* were

composed of coherent regional territories that remained *nationless*, the post-modernizing *nation* is now a congeries of conflicted regional territories that have become *stateless*. The recent (re-)constitution of semi-autonomous indigenous territories within the decaying state's more encompassing orbit may mark a new phase in this dialectic. However, new territorial schemes like that of the Chiapas Zapatistas are still highly contested, even with the Fox government signaling its desire to reach a settlement. Part of the problem lies with such schemes' sometimes controversial notions of land tenure: by late 1994, Zapatistas had declared four "autonomous multiethnic regions" ("*regiones autónomas pluriétnicas"* or RAPs) covering half the area of Chiapas, and hundreds of land invasions had redefined territoriality as a fait accompli.

Even if one accepts that such enclaves were, always have been, or once again are becoming internally coherent, they cannot be separated from their broader contexts. Even when territories have ostensibly been reduced to closed corporate communities, hierarchical political-economic and cultural relationships of center and periphery articulate them into overarching structures, and such relationships characterize their internal as well as external relations. As Lomnitz reminds us,

> …the analysts who wanted to go beyond an international structure of center/periphery and explore the marginalization of the interior of a certain country created concepts like "internal colonialism" [*cf.* González Casanova 1970[1965] –PL]. …Unfortunately, these points of view [still] tended to imagine that each place is clearly either "central" or "peripheral" instead of being a site where different types of center/periphery dialectics operate (Lomnitz 1998:185, PL's trans.).

He goes on to exemplify the replication of center/periphery relations within one anthropologically famous and recently re-indianized town: Tepoztlán, Morelos, near the heartland of Zapata's original 1910 revolution (*cf.* Redfield 1930; Lewis 1960). For instance, since the Mexican economy became more diversified in the 1960s, there are different

> logics and points of "centrality" which compete among themselves: the relationship with the nation-state has been strongly affected by transnational flows of Tepozteco migratory workers, middle and upper class urban colonists, educated and salaried Tepoztecos and the very process of commercializing local culture and resources. This diversification of the economic centers, together with the final decay of the old agrarian structure of the region, has produced significant ideological alterations, even when some of these hide behind a seeming continuity of traditions…(*ibid.*).

The social and ideological complexity complicates identity as well: it has become hard to categorize people as Indians, peasants or workers or to even define the boundaries of this once supposedly closed corporate community. That is, with increasing heterogeneity there is no unified local elite or single economic center for the whole town; instead the very dispersion of economic life leads people to re-assert communal territoriality:

> Families that include members who work as construction workers, petty merchants or specialized workers still like to cultivate a little maize for their own

consumption, and everyone is worried about water shortages or how to find a way to keep or acquire a little land for their children. In this context…nativism [a re-indianization of the culture –PL] is utilized to combat the big corporations and large-scale development projects that endanger the existence of Tepoztlán as a site of social reproduction, while economic necessity is used to legitimize the commercialization of local resources and culture. The idea of personal progress helps motivate emigrants to undertake the difficult journey to the north; the ideal of returning to celebrate the fiestas gives them the strength to continue. Therefore it should not surprise us that such an important number of Tepoztecos—peasants or workers, educated or not—are disposed to publicly adopt an Indian identity that they rejected scarcely 20 years ago: this is part of what is entailed in reproduction on the periphery (Lomnitz 1998: 186).

Especially in Mexico, this diverse set of identifications with territory reflects major historical processes that have affected indigenous communities in the 20th century. These have all been interpreted within Mexican anthropology as well as in government policies and autonomy movements—to both of which anthropology has been linked—so a closer review of that literature is called for.

2.1 Cultural regions, indigenous territories and class contradictions

In a comprehensive article on ethnic citizenship, territoriality and the state in modern Mexico, Guillermo De la Peña (1999) points out that before the 1910 revolution the state defined indigenous territoriality negatively because it was an obstacle to the Liberal modernization of agriculture, and continued to do so after 1910; in fact, revolutionary Mexican nationhood was predicated on the mestizo as its archetypal Citizen.[13] Consequently, for the Revolution's key political philosopher, José Vasconcelos, national territoriality implied that Indian enclaves like the Yaqui valley or the Gran Nayar region (see section 2.4) were "empty of nationality" and identified with the historical or archaeological past (*cf.* Fabian 1983). Indeed, from this perspective, unassimilated *indios bárbaros* were *anti*-national because they were the potential pawns of foreign powers seeking to weaken if not dissolve the nascent revolutionary state.

In particular, Díaz Polanco has criticized the failure of the territorial organization of the Mexican state to reflect "the regional identities founded in socio-ethnic cohesion" (1991:207). Instead, historically

the different territorial divisions have expressed the interests of the forces or local groups (creoles, mestizos or "ladinos"), which has given way to states, provinces, departments, cantons, etc.; but none of these entities is conceived to reflect or honor the sociocultural plurality of the national conglomerate…. In terms of the political-territorial organization of Latin American nation states, ethnic groups have been an *invisible population* (*ibid.*).

In this temporally and politically disjointed ethnic topography, the key state project of *indigenismo* (indigenous development policy) not only sought to absorb Indians into the mestizo mainstream, it also aimed for *recuperación territorial:* the injection of Western ideas into indigenous areas in order to *forjar patria* (forge a

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[13] See also Hewitt de Alcántara 1984, 1988 for a critical analysis of anthropological approaches to rural Mexico since the Revolution.

fatherland) (De la Peña 1999:16). In this concrete sense, it sometimes becomes difficult to separate state political territoriality from subaltern senses of place in the land.

Even before Vasconcelos promulgated the revolutionary vision of Mexican nationhood, Miguel Gamio (1916), Mexico's premier early 20th century anthropologist and the father of *indigenismo*, defined 11 indigenous cultural regions whose otherness had to be abolished. This meant the erasure of internal "ethnic frontiers and the mestization of peoples and territories" (De la Peña 1999:16-17; PL's trans.). Gamio's direct intellectual descendant was Gonzalo Aguirre Beltrán. Aguirre Beltrán's influential notion of *regiones de refugio* (1967) was the most sophisticated version of Gamio's *indigenista* vision, and it guided Indian policy throughout Latin America especially in the 1940s, 50s and 60s.

Aguirre Beltrán saw indigenous communities as satellites supplying raw materials, agricultural commodities and labor power to regional centers. Hence they were not geographically isolated as the romantic vision of "closed corporate communities" held them to be; they were politically subjugated. So for *indigenistas* (indigenous development authorities) and particularly for government anthropologists, territoriality became a relational, interethnic administrative concept rather than an essential historical characteristic of particular peoples. De la Peña points out that with this theoretical development *indigenistas* could undermine the legitimacy of indigenous cultural production for being incompatible with the mestizo polity of which it was now deemed to be part. Aguirre envisioned land reform as a way to acculturate Indians into the polity because the uniform legal administration and economic development of lands under central control would transform intercultural regions from archaic backwaters skewed by ethnically-based power structures into homogeneous, egalitarian "mestizo regions". As part of this centralist plan for social change, all territorial units *not* coterminous with states and *municipios* (counties) were to be abolished. De la Peña considers that this is why Aguirre vehemently opposed the formation of the Consejo Supremo Tarahumara in the 1940s and 50s (*cf.* Aguirre Beltrán 1953:86-93). At the same time that *indigenista* theorists were defining cultural areas to be assimilated, ethnic identity was generally limited to the ethnocentric village level (or at most the *municipio*).

For *indigenistas*, these bounded identities embodied in "surviving" colonial or prehispanic institutions like the *consejo de ancianos* (council of elders) or *cabildo* (town council) simply "indicated lack of participation in national politics" (De la Peña 1999:17). Like the independent regional indigenous organizations, such traditional local institutions—even if perfectly nested into *municipios*—were an obstacle unless they could be taken over by agents of the state (such as bilingual indigenous schoolteachers) and incorporated into the Revolutionary state apparatus. This is precisely what happened in highland Chiapas during the 1940s and 50s (Rus 1994) as well as in Colombia prior to the indigenous activism of the 1970s (see section 4).[14]

Along with government assimilation came new rural class formations. For the Mazatecs who Eckart Boege studied in his neo-Marxian ethnography (1988), *municipio*

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[14] To illustrate how horribly wrong the Aguirre model turned out in practice: in highland Mayan Chiapas, a clique of government bilingual schoolteachers and merchants took over the traditional ceremonial *cargos* and made them into their closed corporate patrimony. With its newfound legitimacy and state connections, this clique monopolized state resources, augmented class differences and concentrated landholding, deterritorializing thousands of former *comuneros* to the slums of San Cristóbal de las Casas or the Lacandón forest, where increasing land pressure was a key cause of the EZLN rebellion (Collier 1994b). These refugees from modernization increasingly identify themselves as Protestants.

limits were supposedly coterminous with dialect boundaries, the style of *traje* (traditional clothing), an endogamous line circumscribing a set of exogamous extended families, and the authority of the *consejos de ancianos* (councils of elders). Thus the *municipio* defined supposedly independent spaces for the exchange of women, *tequio* (corvée) labor, gifts and land, continually reproduced at the moment of forming marital alliances (*ibid.:* 64-65). *Municipio* elders and even national presidents were referred to with kin terms such as "father" provided they maintained legitimacy by participating in their respective reciprocal exchanges to protect and help the community (*ibid.:* 78). Hence, before the collapse of the PRI's modernizing development regime, the legitimacy of the political leadership was part of territorial identity. However, class and political alliances extending beyond the region generated internal contradictions for this scheme.

That is, Boege broke with both the "closed-corporate" and "regions of refuge" models of territoriality by recognizing that commodity production and consumption ties Mazatecs, who formerly were more centered on their *municipios*, to regional, national and transnational commodity flows. These flows contradict, foreground, expand and displace regional territoriality based on a Mesoamerican maize, beans and squash subsistence economy. As Boege explained it, the wealthy members of the *cabildo/consejo de ancianos* in the *municipio*–each of whom may have 150 personal contacts among large networks of extended families—have state patronage to monopolize credit and land (coffee plantations in the Mazatec case, cattle or drugs elsewhere) (*cf.* Greenberg 1989, for an in-depth study of violence and capitalist development in nearby Chatino communities in lowland Oaxaca). However, the rich men still get poor people to be their clients by granting them generous terms for renting land or trucks and by participating in the *tequio*. These pyramidal patron-client relations typify rural *caciques*, who mediate the state (as described in a classic article by Eric Wolf, 1957).

As they concentrate wealth, bourgeois members of the *consejo de ancianos* foist duplicitous definitions of territory on their different interlocutors. That is, these patrons try to force their poor clients within their community to accept that land is *individual property* so that they can buy more of it. At the same time they try to convince their patrons in the government that the very same lands are *communal property* which they legitimately represent so that they can expand their political power and get more state resources (Boege 1988:84).   Here Rodman's notion that territoriality is "multivocal"—composed of differing perspectives—is exemplified within a single, Machiavellian set of speakers who pitch their voices to contrasting audiences.

In case of conflict between the *municipio* and the mestizo state, the *consejo de ancianos* may mark its supposedly communal interests as more strongly *indio* (*ibid.*). This ethnification is also one of the hallmarks of the ongoing Zapatista rebellion as well as the situation described for Colombia and other territorial movements throughout Latin America. Just as *vertical* relations between an indigenous territory and the state can foreground ethnic identities and blur internal class contradictions, *horizontal* competition between homologous units of otherwise closely related people can unite each one (*ibid.:* 83), even as it fragments them ethnically. As noted in the introduction, horizontal conflict is more common (even though vertical tensions may underlie them).

Regardless of whether the conflicts are vertical or horizontal, Boege frames the title of his book, *Los mazatecos ante la nación: contradicciones de la identidad étnica en el México actual* (Mazatecs facing the nation: contradictions of ethnic identity in contemporary Mexico), with a Marxist question:

> How long can the contradictions with the outside keep internal group contradictions on a secondary plane? …The class contradictions inside the group will make this form of ethnic struggle substantially more difficult. How then will the ethnic group redefine itself facing the nation (1988: 85)?

However, such dialectical formulations cannot take the impact of a global mode of production on a particular place for granted: Netting (1984, 1993) would suggest that cultivators like the Mazatecs may not develop full-fledged social classes but instead maintain small units of non-proletarianized labor organization.

Like Lomnitz in his Tepoztlán study (1998), Boege goes on to elaborate the internal territorial disjunctures created by the introduction of capitalist relations of production: "with the introduction of commercial crops, the ethnic region stops coinciding with the unified economic region…Economic organization does not necessarily coincide with social organization nor the latter with political and religious organization" (Boege 1988:55,57). He also argues that market demands are responsible for much of the ecological devastation in the region. More generally, for Boege "the study of power in a particular region consists of analyzing the political framework in which the precarious equilibrium between capital and its process of reproduction and expansion and the resistance of the different groups of workers" (Boege 1988:57).

This type of transformation has been noted on a finer-grained level of analysis: Wilk's (1984) study of differentially integrated K'ekchi Maya households in Belize shows how changing agricultural production generates new economic relationships among the kin who constitute those households. This in turn leads to new residential patterns and household types within the community—the regional political-economic determination of micro-territoriality. For instance, once committed to capitalist market production, "*Regional* variation in the abundance of land and the availability of access to markets and transportation … affects residence choices, sometimes as much as the [ecological] considerations of production…" (Wilk 1984:234). Such studies provide material for understanding local land use practices in terms of regional political regimes and globalized discourses.

Boege's critique of the hierarchical mediation of power in indigenous *municipios* was part of an attack from both intellectual and popular quarters that began in the 1960s and 70s against what De la Peña calls the "centralist fallacies underlying many official visions of Mexico's territory". In particular, the revisionist political scientist Pablo González Casanova (1970[1965]) launched his famous critique of the "internal colonialism" that capital and the government visit upon indigenous areas (but recall Lomnitz's 1998 observation that this model overlooks the reproduction of center/periphery relations within the periphery). Other key actors in the intellectual attack on *indigenista* paternalism were the cultural geographers around Claude Bataillon (1982[1969], 1973) and the micro-historians around Luis González y González. In particular, González y González's *Pueblo en vilo* (1968)—a fine-grained rendering of one Michoacán mestizo pueblo's autonomous world view in terms of land, labor and national historical developments over 200 years—remains a classic of Mexican rural history.

De la Peña points out that these writers subverted the *indigenista* paradigm's indigenous/mestizo dichotomy by demonstrating that a range of regional cultures spans it. More generally, he notes that after the government crushed the 1968 student movement a whole generation of anthropologists revived Moisés Sáenz's critique of

agrarian *caciquismo* (bossism) from the 1930s and 40s (Friedrich 1968; Bonfil 1972; Bartra 1975; Warman 1976; De la Peña 1986; Greenberg 1989, to name a few key works). And other significant writings (Spicer 1962; Nutini 1968; García Alcaraz 1973; J. Collier 1973; G. Collier 1975; Friedrich 1977; Boege *op. cit.*) pointed to indigenous peoples' creative resistance and persistent identities; those identities were now recognized as having positive content regardless of whether they are "marginalized" by mestizos. Studies of peasant rebellions, often of strongly indigenous character, were the strongest exemplars of these attacks. In particular, Friedrich's *Agrarian revolt in a Mexican village* (1977) has been cited for its insights into indigenous agrarian radicalism and violence in Tarascan Michoacán during the later revolutionary period.

     Agrarian revolt illuminates political territoriality with its focus on the emotional and ideological power in land, maize and motherhood, key values of indigenous culture throughout Mesoamerica. The violation of these values by government-backed land expropriations spawned suffering and rage that Indian leaders articulated into a collective political program. They first mobilized this program against the non-indigenous investors and peasant clients who had expropriated their mother-land. But disturbingly, once they themselves became state clients and Boege's hierarchical contradictions took hold, they turned against each other (*cf.* Friedrich 1986, for a more in-depth look at the Machiavellian indigenous political actors themselves and Boyer 1997 for their relationship to the revolutionary state). All these works now saw territorial identities extending beyond individual communities; some "allude to regional solidarities and even to historically constituted ethnic territories" (De la Peña 1999:19), but Friedrich pointed most specifically to how such territories emerge from concrete, deeply conflicted political practice.

2.2 Migration and other kinds of translocality

At the same time that researchers in Mexico were recognizing more spatially extensive and historically rooted indigenous territorialities, migration was breaking them down, along with the previously sharp distinctions between Indian/mestizo, peasant/worker, traditional/modern, country/city (Arizpe 1985; De la Peña 1981). Indeed,

> …perhaps the most important members of many households are those who are not in residence at all. …In those peripheral parts of the world system where labor migration is appreciable, households must be examined for the presence of intermittent coresidents whose economic contributions adapt local productive and reproductive units to the demands of larger, money-based exchange sytems (Wilk & Netting 1984:19; cf. Massey 1987 on this key relationship between western Mexico and the US).

     Arizpe in particular points to how, for Mazahua people from the state of México, migration produces a non-local identity: they maintain ties with their home villages *in absentia* because of their precariousness in Mexico City. This scenario could be the exception that proves the rule: rural-urban migration usually deindianizes people because if the move is successful, people often become more mestizo (culturally assimilated). However, as De la Peña points out, sometimes people maintain their home identities despite having consolidated urban economic bases (Hirabayashi 1993). In any case, these studies suggest that for urban Indians, enduring ties to territory are largely discursive or indirectly material: even if they recover an ancestral sense of place, they may send mutual aid to their rural kin and support them through voluntary associations rather than engage in primary production back home. Migration may also

lead to "a virtual reconstruction of communal spaces and institutions in urban niches" (De la Peña 1999:19): a parallel territoriality. De la Peña cites the Otomís who have created a neo-traditional *barrio* next to the Guadalajara, Jalisco, city dump but say they still "live" in Santiago Mexquititlán, Querétaro, a village hundreds of kilometers away, which they may only visit on ritual occasions (Martínez Casas 1998). One would like to know more about the estrangement of "living" in a distant "neighborhood" one no longer inhabits and only rarely visits because it suggests that constructing a markedly cultural "locality" does not necessarily imply territoriality there. In yet another experience of deterritorialization, people who in most ways have apparently adopted urban lifeways indistinguishable from those of the predominant mestizo population and have lost all connection to a traditional community may still consider themselves indigenous in some sense. That is, they may adopt aboriginal identities and a relatively placeless sense of rootedness in the territory based on neo-indigenous ritual and discourse (la Nueva Mexicanidad). This path out of modernity belies the supposedly homogenous nature of the urban population and addresses its alienation (De la Peña 1999: 20).

Of course the different spaces inhabited by indigenous peoples may traverse international as well as rural/urban divides (cf. Rouse 1991; Boruchoff 1999). The most well-known transnational indigenous territorialities involve Mixtec and Zapotec people, originally from Oaxaca, as well as the aforementioned Mazahuas (Nagengast & Kearney 1990, possibly the most famous single article on the topic; also see Pérez Ruiz 1993; Valenzuela 1998). These peoples' extremely extended cycles of migration to and from home communities give rise to "transnational, or postnational identity" (De la Peña 1999:20). As a result, to extend the internal communal disjunctures that Boege noted for the Mazatecs and Lomnitz for the Tepoztecos, "…not only has the distinction between ethnic spaces and national spaces been dissolved: the magic formula that maintained the territory, people and State united has been broken" (*ibid.:* 21). In this sense, "territoriality" in this essay corresponds to Slater's notion of "spatiality", since for him identification with place is not necessarily contained by the nation-state (1998:381ff., a theoretically venturesome essay on globalized identity).

Regardless of the terminology, there is a marked tendency nowadays to form transnational territorial relationships through explicitly political means, as in "new social movements":

> In particular, new associations have been made between democratization and decentralization, and in the struggle against centralism new forms of spatial subjectivity and identity have emerged. These new forms, which contest the given territoriality of the political system, can be viewed as reflections of the political expressed spatially (Slater 1998:387).

Kearney (1996:182), in another theoretically ambitious work, sums up the range of territorial relationships in Mixtec history in terms of the classical "closed corporate community" which had been deliberately isolated from and set against its neighbors. Because of such vertically inspired horizontal conflicts, these communities (whether articulated into regional territories or not) have now become "transnational communities". The old mother *pueblo* remains the "spiritual core" and its various offshoots in other regions or countries identify with it. However, the offshoots may also break off relations and still retain rooted indigenous identities, as discussed in this essay's concluding section on Colombia. Another factor promoting transnational

territoriality is state-sponsored "development". In southern Mexico, hydroelectric projects in densely settled indigenous areas have been notorious in this regard (see ff. 6). Extractive development (logging and extensive grazing) has also disrupted the sustainability of indigenous territoriality throughout the country.

Whether they displace people to resettlement communities inside national borders or to transnational migration circuits, these projects can generate new, more generalized indigenous identities to contest deterritorialization (a process discussed in detail in the Colombian literature).

> … the [Mixteca] region has been and is the target of innumerable development programs and projects (Collins 1995). However, the history of the Mixteca since the conquest has been one of constant environmental deterioration and economic stagnation.…There is thus a perverse correlation between the presence of development projects and the persistence of de-development.…This situation suggests that breaking through this impasse requires abandonment of the hegemonic definitions of "development" and of "rural peasant communities" …a breakthrough might be possible through displacements to other organizational contexts in which alternative identities and projects are possible. In the case of the Mixtecs, such political displacements are nurtured by spatial displacement, namely, migration (Kearney 1996:175-76)

Consequently "the Mixtecs" as a people are now simultaneously denizens of the original Oaxacan heartland and neophyte urban shantytown dwellers, as well as long-time migrant farmworkers in northwestern Mexico and more recently in US California. Because of the farmwork, they identified and initially sought to organize themselves as "agricultural proletarians" but had little more success than as land-poor peasants in Oaxaca (*ibid.:*15-22, 176). Subsequent urban squatters' movements and the women's ethnic artwork that has emerged from them represent a new set of identity-based strategies and claims as well as a newly articulated transnational territory: "Oaxacalifornia" (176-77, 182).

To summarize thus far, there are wildly divergent meanings of territoriality in Mexico: a coherent national space in the mestizo imagination, a coherent regional space in indigenous historical memory and ceremony, isolated communities based on subsistence production in the service of an urban mestizo elite, and migratory communities rediscovering (or reinventing) aboriginal links. These territorialities may depend on land use, land struggle or other collective efforts at (re)constituting cultural places, or they may be largely discursive. All this indicates the empirical and theoretical complexity of what De la Peña calls "the drastic contrast between the concept of territory from an administrative perspective and the concept of those who experience it and subvert mechanisms of control, borders and the official definition of spaces on a daily basis" (1999:20). One can also say that the reindianization of a nation-state's territory counteracts the statelessness and denationalization of Indians.

As indigenous people find themselves in increasingly diverse, unprecedented relationships to geographical places, they depart from peasant livelihoods and enter more generalized and fragmented class positions. With the Mixtecs and with the Tepoztecos discussed by Lomnitz at the beginning of section 2, these new relationships may not be expressed in terms of class at all but in terms of "the so-called new [pan-indigenous] ethnicity, human rights, and ecopolitics" (Kearney 1996:177-78). Kearney

seems to forget that land and peasant production are full of symbolic value and that ethnic values depend on symbols tied to the land and traditional forms of economic production. However, he is surely right in one sense: in order for new, deterritorialized identities to cohere, new symbols are necessary.

> Unlike peasantness as an identity that, because of its productionist nature, is tied only to certain environmental and political landscapes that permit it, ethnicity has no such direct dependence on the means of production. It is thus a dimension of identity suitable for the dispossessed, the exiled, those in diaspora, the marginal, the migrant, the diverse…. [E]ven movements of ethnic autonomy, which may seek some kind of territorial autonomy, nevertheless involve not only the struggle for land and other economic value; they involve the struggle for symbolic value as well. For just as control of land as means of production allows for the creation and possession of economic value, so does the possession of collective symbolic value translate into political potency (Kearney 1996:179-80).

As the next section illustrates, collective symbolic value is very important to the indigenous autonomy movement in Oaxaca and especially to the EZLN, many members of which are not from indigenous communities and certainly do not have deep roots in the Lacandón forest.[15]

2.3 Autonomous regimes in Chiapas and Oaxaca

In Mexico the ongoing attacks on the assimilationist model of indigenous development—along with the desire for a progressive international image—led President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988-94) to sign Convention 169 in 1990. It thus became Mexican national law, and in 1992 Salinas made his PRI-controlled Congress amend Article 4 of the Constitution to officially define Mexico as a multicultural country for the first time since the colonial caste system was abolished in the early 19th century (http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/r1citp.htm).

However, unlike Colombia, where the constitutional reform specified territories and degrees of indigenous autonomy, the vague wording of Mexico's Article 4 led to an as yet unresolved debate over its meaning and the content of any enabling legislation (*leyes reglamentarias*). This debate was sharpened and transformed by the 1994 uprising of the EZLN in Chiapas: it led to unprecedented negotiations between the rebels and the government and the 1996 San Andrés Larráinzar Accords calling for indigenous autonomy. Likewise, proposals by the multilateral COCOPA (Comisión de Concordia y Pacificación) peace arbitration commission and the state government of Oaxaca called for policies based on the legal recognition of the category of *pueblo indígena* (indigenous people) (http://www.ezln.org/fzln/cocopa961129-sp.html). As of this posting Mexico's newly inaugurated PANista president Vicente Fox Quesada is promising to dramatically mediate all these long-stalled indigenous issues between the dramatically visible Zapatista *comandancia* and a resolutely unmoved Congress (ongoing coverage at http://www.jornada.unam.mx/index.html and http://www.fzln.org.mx/).

Indígenas are now defined in Article 4 as the population descended from Mexico's preconquest inhabitants, who are conscious of their historical identity and

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[15] That region has been colonized primarily since 1960 when the population there was only 5000; by 1980 it had exploded to 300,000 (Van Cott 1996: http://www.ndu.edu/ndu/inss/macnair/mcnair53/m53c3.html).

have partially reproduced it. Although a sustained territorial plan for the Zapatista region remains to be carried out, much suggestive discussion has appeared in the journal *Memoria: Revista de Política y Cultura* associated with the anthropologist Héctor Díaz Polanco, as well as in the Zapatista-inspired journal *Ce-Acatl* (1996:27-32), which has aired many of the EZLN's visions, proposals and demands (ceacatl@laneta.apc.org; see also *Cuadernos de la Gaceta* 1993). There is also a useful summary of the rebellion's agrarian and political history in Collier (1994a).[16]

Not much of the subsequent discourse about territoriality in Mexico can be understood independently of the EZLN. One of its signal ideological documents defines territory in both ecological and broader cultural terms as "the totality of the habitat that indigenous peoples occupy or utilize in some way as the basis of their sustainable self-development" (López Bárcenas 1996, cited in Barabas 1998:360ff; PL's trans.; cf. Toledo 1989, a leading theorist of indigenous autonomy). This is a more encompassing definition than Findji and Rojas's (1985:261) kindred notion of "space of social reproduction" outside the market system.

Territoriality often has been formulated in tandem with the equally problematic notion of "autonomy", which people have understood in wildly divergent ways: as part of a political program of ethnic de-assimilation or de-mestization, a reversion to premodern forms of local patriarchal authoritarianism (Bartra 1998), an anarchistic fragmentation of the state, a strategy that backfires to actually increase peasants' dependence on the state (Gros 1997), a return to ancestral authenticity, etc. Or as Díaz Polanco describes the misperceptions: "autarky, separatism, full sovereignty, return to the 'natural' life, etc." (1991:150; PL's trans.). Insofar as he considers a general definition of "the system of autonomy" to be feasible, he adopts formal political terms:

> a special regime that configures its own government (auto-government) for certain member communities which thus choose authorities who are part of the collectivity, exercise legally attributed powers and have minimal capacities to legislate their internal life and administer their affairs (*ibid.:*151).

The new Colombian constitutional definition may be taken as a basic legal groundwork for both countries:

> The authorities of indigenous communities will be able to exercise juridical functions within their territory, according to their own norms and procedures, so long as these are not contrary to the Constitution and to the laws of the Republic.

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[16] Without mentioning territoriality per se, Collier succinctly describes how the EZLN rebellion has emerged from a classically complex mixture of territorial regimes in Chiapas, particularly in the Lacandón forest. They include large cattle and coffee estates, dependent peasant clients (*peones acasillados*) surrounding and defending these estates, smallholders (*parcelarios*) and more recent colonists (*colonos*) from the highlands and elsewhere in Mexico, all in the context of the developing international frontier with Guatemala. The Zapatista ideology of territorial autonomy emerges from independent peasant organizations (the Organización Campesina Emiliano Zapata –OCEZ— and the Confederación Independiente de Obreros Agrícolas y Campesinos –CIOAC) as well as from Catholic liberation theology's vision of social justice and democratic organizational structure, a sort of leftist counter-reformation response to the inroads made by decentralized, socially supportive Protestant churches in the area. It should be recalled that such ideological conflicts between Zapatistas and their neighbors also reflect factional splits within and between villages (Friedrich: *pers. com.*).

The forms of coordination of this special jurisdiction with the national judicial system will be established by law (Colombia 1991: Art. 246) [*cf.* Art. 4 ff.].

Indigenous definitions may be far less equivocal:

AUTONOMY for us, the Guambianos, is the right we have to direct and guide, to manage, to decide, and freely determine our internal [communal] life in all aspects: economic, social, political, cultural, and ecological, by means of the sovereign participation of our people (quoted in Gow 1997:256).

Accepting the principles of autonomy laid out in these theories and legal measures could lead to political-administrative reterritorialization as indigenous peoples articulate *municipios* into *distritos* under their control (*redistritación*) and thereby even modify state borders through the "constitution of intermunicipal associations in ethnodevelopment programs" and a "grouping of indigenous *municipios* in autonomous ethnic regions" (De la Peña 1999:22-23). This would directly stand Aguirre Beltrán's state assimilationist agenda on its head (1953:92).

Díaz Polanco (1999: 210-223) presents such a historical movement for cultural, political and economic autonomy in Oaxaca, where Triqui and Huave people have attempted to form larger indigenous entities through *redistritación* and thus have dissociated themselves from the mestizo *municipios* to which they had been relegated as satellite *regiones de refugio*. He also briefly mentions the Nahuatl-speaking Zempoala region of the Sierra Norte in Puebla as another ethnically coherent area where *redistritación* would be workable. Although he does not discuss it, the Gran Nayar region of Jalisco, Nayarit, Durango and Zacatecas has similar characteristics. In any event, autonomy does not imply the expulsion of non-Indians, only their equality with the formerly subordinated peoples (*ibid.*:223,229). Díaz Polanco calls for

a new *step* in political-territorial organization, with the double purpose of being able to constitute regional entities (that group together various *municipios*, when this should be the case) and of leading to autonomy, especially for those regions where indigenous peoples have an appreciable or majority presence. It could be claimed that the legal status constituted by *municipios* can be enlarged and enriched so as to configure truly autonomous entities (*ibid.*:224).

Barabas (1998) undertakes another major discussion of autonomous territoriality in an article dealing with municipal autonomy in Oaxaca. Like Díaz Polanco, she discusses the *municipio,* Oaxacan *comunidad* and *distrito* as well as the Catalonian *mancomunidad, comarca* and *intermunicipalidad*. For her, the *municipio* in particular is the basic "territorial space of self-government, defended from outside power in numerous rebellions" (*cf.* Pérez and Navarro 1996:21). In the same breath, however, she also views these resistant spaces of historical autonomy as "the basic cell that links central power with the social units it governs" (1998: 344; PL's trans.).[17] Hence, "localities could be the basis for a restructuring in which the *municipio* would be the articulating instance

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[17] The smaller unit of the *comunidad* and the larger one of the multi-municipal *distrito* in Oaxaca are briefly mentioned because of the great variations among the state's 9800 communities and because Oaxaca contains 570 of the entire country's roughly 2400 *municipio*s. Therefore they have been organized into 30 *distritos* to simplify administration.

between the State and constellation of local autonomies" (*ibid.:*362). Barabas considers that if autonomous *municipios* are restructured along "ethnocultural" lines, it will remove the legacy of state and class domination (*ibid.:*345). Invoking the title of Clifford Geertz's 1983 book, Barabas claims that such an indigenous order which "seeks to create or recreate an internal political culture for autonomy sustained by local knowledge is frequent in Oaxaca" (*ibid.:*362). For her "local knowledge" is a synonym for "common sense" and the commonly invoked essentialism of *costumbre* (custom)—the selected everyday norms and practices now officially recognized by the amended Mexican constitution and objectified in the emergent institution of *ley consuetudinaria* (customary law) (*ibid.:*346-347). More generally, for this type of project to succeed Barabas concludes that

> One necessary path is to research the concrete networks…having to do with…beliefs, ritual practices, sites of worship, institutions, kinship, activities or objectives with the power to convocation…of…historical, linguistic, kinship, ecological, economic, religious, ethnopolitical…ethnocultural affinities within each ethnolinguistic group. This would permit the interested parties to design a geopolitical reordering in which the communities would join more embracing units with new political and territorial borders. But any attempt at ethnocultural reorganization of governments and indigenous borders must be based on the local knowledge where the networks of affinities which constitute the social substance of the ethnolinguistic groups are reproduced (*ibid.:*348,363).

> Other recent theorizing in Mexican anthropology (De la Peña 1995; Rosaldo 1994) has reflected (and helped to formulate) these trends under the rubric of *"ciudadanía étnica"* ("ethnic citizenship"). This refers to the right of

> cultural identity and differentiated societal organization within a State, which in turn must not only recognize but also protect and legally sanction such difference. All this implies the reformulation of what up to now we have called the nation-state. …its functions of centralist territorial and cultural homogenization are now put in doubt…safeguarding [indigenous] human rights and status as citizens implies a reformulation of the nature of territory, jurisdictions and forms of representation (De la Peña 1999:23-24).

Two distinct dynamics emerge from this review of 20th century Mexican anthropological notions about territory. As De la Peña phrases it, in the first "…in a large number of countries there are diasporic groups whose actions resignify territories and subvert the conception of these countries as self-contained and immutable". In the second dynamic, indigenous territorial recognition and autonomy beyond the government's agrarian framework are based on people's historical patrimony and current economic and ceremonial practices *within* a national territory. The state may not have much more hegemony over such internal populations than it does over transnationalized ones. De la Peña does not discuss the second dynamic as much as the first (mostly because it is still largely on the drawing board, but it will certainly be an important area for political work and research). Questions include what strategies these expanded indigenous territorial regimes will develop and what internal conflicts will emerge as a result. Issues may include resource distribution, democratization, the rights to politically entextualize cultural tradition (Briggs 1996), and more concretely,

the legitimacy of new indigenous brokers in semi-autonomous cultural formations (Jackson 1989, 1995).

Despite its stated willingness to debate, the Zedillo administration's (1994-2000) proposals for the Chiapas peace process ruled out any ethnically based territory that jumps jurisdictions defined by the government and local agrarian regimes. The historically unprecedented change of government in Mexico taking place as this piece was being written promises major transformations. These may include both specific issues like the Chiapas conflict and the general configuration and extension of the state as the neoliberal project continues to evolve.

2.4 Ancestrality and exchange in El Gran Nayar

The Gran Nayar region in the southern Sierra Madre Occidental of western Mexico represents a spatially far more extensive territoriality than those being constructed in densely populated indigenous regions of southern Mexico (reviewed above) or in the Cauca Valley of Colombia (reviewed below). Like many of the systems described in post-1968 Mexican ethnographies, the Gran Nayar's territoriality is rooted in historical memory and political structures but also in foraging and ceremonial practice. Some of this region's peoples (especially the Huichols) now claim both their colonial title lands in the Sierra and ceremonial access throughout 90,000 square kilometers spanning six states. They traded, hunted and carried out sacrifices across this area for at least half a millenium before the Spanish invasion and remained hierarchically organized under Cora and Tepecano tributary chiefdoms for the first 200 years thereafter (McCarty & Matson 1975[1673]; Weigand 1981, 1985; Arcos García *et al.* 1992; Rojas 1993). This is just one region that belies the eternal stereotype of indigenous settlements as egalitarian "closed corporate communities". Instead it suggests alternative, indigenous forms of regional hierarchical power. Indeed, Gupta and Ferguson's warning about the nation-state can also be applied to indigenous regions: "The presumption that spaces are autonomous has enabled the power of topography to conceal successfully the topography of power" (1992:8).

More specifically, Huichol territoriality is a set of historically superimposed, culturally "thick", socially and spatially circumscribed exchange relationships defined by ceremonial treks through circuits of sites (Liffman 2000). That is, Huichols have developed cultural identifications with "localities" selected from more open-ended fields of historical migration, trade and ecological relationships, particularly dry season hunting routes and the colonial mining economy. In this sense, Huichol territoriality is an emergent "sense of place" defined as much by what the "centered" participants exclude from "decentered" global flows of things and people as by what they mark as uniquely meaningful to themselves (Feld & Basso 1996; Entrikin 1991; Munn 1996).[18] One has to have an eye for detail in these matters because the practices that distinguish a local territory from larger, more impersonal global flows may be quite humble: narrating (Basso 1984), gathering (Povinelli 1993), leaving offerings (Coyle & Liffman

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[18] More formally, this "sense" depends on two complementary processes: 1) ongoing circuits of movement, exchange and discourse both within and across the ostensible boundaries of a regional world, 2) which the participants demarcate and interconnect in terms of more limited communal symbolic identifications held to be centrally meaningful *for that locality* (like a still shot frozen out of a movie). As even "autocthonous" people are increasingly deterritorialized, they adapt discourses produced in NGOs, globalized identity movements and other sectors of the public sphere to defend the domestic sphere. This is territoriality reinscribed through absence, which paradoxically makes it grow stronger.

2000) and so on. These micro-practices are part of what Appadurai (1996:180) has called "a general technology (and teleology) of localization". It should be clear by now that even on a micro level, this technology has political implications.

Huichols call their hierarchically structured territory of sacrificial exchange *kiekari* (from *kie*, *ranchería* or "extended family estate", and *kari*, an abstracting or generalizing noun suffix: "estatedness"). It is articulated as temple groups *(tukipa)* and extended family members fulfill relations of collective reciprocity at ancestral sites. These practices are now the basis for claims to ceremonial access under Article 4 and Convention 169. Also, the spatially dispersed networks of *rancherías* that constitute the *tukipa* use their organization as the grounds for making permanent claims to lands they inhabit within the 4000 square kilometers encompassed by their colonial titles but not recognized by the much smaller contemporary "*resoluciones*" of those titles (Liffman *et al.* 1995).

To further these claims, since the 1990s Huichols have had increasing regional, national and international links based in part on alliances between young bilingual teacher-politicians, traditional ritual authorities and non-governmental organizations. Unlike a social movement, Huichol culture has historically deep, structurally encompassing organizational bonds. However, because of these links, they have begun to describe themselves more like members of a unified ethnic movement as generic *indígenas, indios* or *huicholes* instead of in terms of more particular identifications like their *comunidades,* temple groups or even *rancherías.* Particularly to remedy their administrative fragmentation and subordination under mestizo authorities within the 4000 square kilometer colonial title lands, an emergent pan-ethnic regional administration (the Unión de Comunidades Indígenas Huicholes—UCIH—in Jalisco and the Unión de Comunidades y Ejidos Indígenas—UCEI—in Nayarit) was established in 1990 under the auspices of the Instituto Nacional Indigenista (INI) and linked to Salinas's remedial safety net, the Programa Nacional de Solidaridad (PRONASOL). Now administratively independent in an era of expanding indigenous land tenure on the regional level and indigenous rights on the national and international levels, the UCIH and UCEI seek to orchestrate a regional land rights and cultural revival strategy, regulate extractive processes, and to foment long-term sustainable, self-sufficient production and petty commerce. Phil C. Weigand (1972, 1993) shows that kin-based cooperative labor groups are a key link between corporate *cargo* institutions and the dispersed households of extensive cultivators, and may the basis for these new kinds of regionally coordinated production. At the same time, differential access to regional markets and resources is increasing class contradictions and land struggle within the *comunidades.*

Urteaga's examination of the contradiction between "ethnic" (*i.e.,* cultural) and "legal" (*i.e.,* state) territorialities in the Tarahumara, Tepehuano, Pima and Guarohío regions of Durango and Chihuahua to the north of the Gran Nayar (1995:236) is relevant to this general discussion. The article features an introduction to the classic bibliography on indigenous settlement patterns there. Urteaga also analyzes the impact of widespread drug cultivation on indigenous community structures and political organization, a situation somewhat comparable to the Colombian case. For a far more in-depth treatment of the relationship between the state, non-indigenous colonists and intracommunal violence in an historically deep, ceremonially based political-territorial structure within the Gran Nayar region, see Coyle on the Santa Teresa Coras (In press).

In sum, the Huichols exemplify the fact that territoriality encompasses a range of concepts, rights, practices and contradictions relating to land use. Forms of land use

extend from legal and exclusive communal tenure by extended families on some lands, through seasonally distributed multi-ethnic access for different productive practices on other ones, to intermittent ceremonial access to sacred sites as well as more individualized or emergent processes of generating new "cultural places". The latter happens by associating a new place with an existing repertoire of linguistic images and mythological texts, what could be called "topopoeisis". In this regard, Ingrid Geist (1996:91) has pointed to the fundamental fluidity of Huichol ceremonial territoriality: in its most elemental form, "Pilgrims, with their symbolic load of ritual objects placed in their shoulder bags, install themselves as the center of the world, a center that moves itself" (PL's trans.). However, for this kind of ceremonial practice to constitute a territorial claim, it cannot be individualistic; it must be enacted within the ritual framework of temple organization, if not the agrarian courts where the state's recognition of colonial Spanish titles and contemporary habitation is paramount (Liffman 1995, 1996, 2000).

Like Friedrich's description of how Tarascan political violence reconstituted communal lands in Michoacán and Boege's labor-based notion of identity in Oaxaca, the ceremonial constitution of landscape in the Gran Nayar demonstrates the need for a practice-based approach to territoriality (Coyle & Liffman 2000). Such an approach—whether it analyzes violence, labor or ritual—foregrounds the fact that territory constitutes an evolving cultural space and history—instead of just reflecting a presumably immutable cosmological hierarchy (described in Neurath's 1998 structuralist ethnography).). In the neoliberal legal conjuncture, these indigenous peoples have been learning the political power of their collective, narrative-and-practice based territoriality. They now document and present territorial narratives and ceremonies before national political audiences as evidence of long-term habitation and cultural memory. These are metapragmatic political demonstrations of their belonging to places and consequently of those places belonging to them (Liffman 1997, a paper on Huichol temple groups extending a ceremonial trek to march in the streets of Jalisco's state capital).

3. COLOMBIA
"For once-isolated rural indigenous and black communities in Latin America, heightened awareness of ethnic identity is also a response to territorial intrusions, and has intensified the traditional struggle for land throughout the region." -Donna Van Cott 1996.

3.0 Land, territory and ethnodevelopment
As in Mexico, Colombia's official indigenous policy was assimilationist into the 1960s, but since the emergence of the first contemporary indigenous movement in 1971 (when "land reform" provoked an agrarian crisis), resistance to cultural assimilation has been expressed in territorial terms. This initially referred to two specific laws:

> Indians organized in the 1960s to demand government compliance with Law 135 of 1961, which called for the expansion of Indian *resguardos* (the inalienable communal property of indigenous communities, governed by councils called *cabildos* under Colombian law) according to the cultural, social, and economic development necessary for the survival of the indigenous communities, as well as Law 89 of 1890, which returned to indigenous communities lands that legitimately belonged to them according to their titles and possession (Van Cott 1996).

According to Christian Gros, one of the analysts who has best integrated local and state level phenomena, since then

> Everywhere the recognition of a territory that is the collective property of the community is a central demand.… Now, the land that is claimed is thought of fundamentally as the site of an indigenous territoriality, a consubstantial part of the group, the basis of its origin myths and identity. It is also the place for the exercise of autonomy and sovereignty (Gros 1991:318; PL's trans.).

However, lest it be thought that these are conservative, irredentist demands, their hybridity (if not contradictions, *cf.* Boege 1988 above) are apparent:

> When the land is claimed it is done in the name of inalienable historical rights and a way of life they want to defend. However, the claim is also represented as a very "modern" interest inscribed in the framework of economic and social relations between communities and the dominant society. This is because land is also considered *an economic good*, a factor of immense importance for the future, a patrimony which everywhere they want to make more valuable through new techniques and the contribution of credit with new organizations (cooperatives, communal enterprises, etc.) and frequently with the support of foreign actors, state technicians, NGOs, etc. (Gros, *op. cit.*).

In this section we will see how the extent, meaning and agency of territorial claims has changed since 1971, especially in the Cauca valley. With regard to their extent,

> As of this moment [1991] *resguardos* are found in the Andean region, where they are of ancient creation (as in Cauca, Nariño, Tolima, etc.) as well as on the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, los Llanos [the plains] or the Amazonian jungle. To

the nearly 150 *cabildos* belong the administration of the 16 million hectares for which they are responsible.

With regard to their meaning and agency,

> What to think of all this?
> In the first place, with the creation of new indigenous organizations, most of which have inscribed the recognition of their lands, the defense of their autonomy, and respect for communal authority as the central demand in their programs, mere chronology permits one to discern a cause-and-effect relationship: subjected to indigenous pressure, the State has seen itself forced to concede and recognize *an indigenous territoriality*, and to move more rapidly than the indigenous movement itself, anticipating its demands (Gros 1991:315).

Gros explains this curious situation as the "confluence of a double necessity, a double logic". On one hand indigenous communities need to structure themselves in a "more modern way" to defend against "land loss, capitalist development, demographic growth, cultural changes and to maintain, reinforce or reestablish their cohesion". On the other, a nation-state confronted by heavy conflict in the countryside and a "grave loss of legitimacy" needs "to stem drug and guerrilla activity, protect border areas and national hydrological resources, find interlocutors and broaden its hegemony" (*ibid.*:316). Indians have little interest in state power themselves, so when the government promotes indigenous territoriality by recognizing more *resguardos* and ceding them autonomy within 19 million hectares of land, it is a relatively small price to pay (*ibid.*:324-326). However, with the recent escalation of US involvement in Colombia's "drug war" (most recently a $1.3 billion allocation was approved by Congress and approved by the President, Bill Clinton), indigenous actors who had been pivotal buffers in the conflict may be marginalized. See http://www.usoutofcolombia.org/ for a critical news digest.

3.1 The Cauca Valley
Many studies of movements for indigenous territorial autonomy in Colombia focus on the Cauca valley in the country's southern Andean highlands, an area of large haciendas where 40% of the country's Indians live. Indigenous claims have gone through grassroots organizations, particularly the Consejo Regional Indígena del Cauca (CRIC), a coalition of *cabildo* authorities key to the politicization of indigenous peoples since its founding in 1971. With a heavy Spanish colonial impact and hacienda development — particularly in sugar – the region is somewhat comparable to early 20th century Morelos, the cradle of Emiliano Zapata's revolutionary movement. The importance of haciendas makes it hard to fully distinguish them from the *resguardos* that oppose them:

> We must stress the existence of this collective actor—the community—which is the protagonist of the movement that has taken shape historically in the haciendas. Both because of the hacienda's internal structure and because of the resistance that this structure generated among the people, the hacienda itself reinforced and reproduced the communal structure of "the Indians" (Findji 1992: 117)

Precisely because indigenous identity was being reproduced under capitalism, there had long been conflicts between indigenous people and the corrupt *caciques* who controlled their *cabildos* (town councils) as well as the haciendas and their political representatives, the *municipios* (county governments) (Findji 1992: 116,119; *cf.* Stern 1983, 1987). In particular Páez Indian *terrajeros* (hacienda tenant farmers) sought to (re-)appropriate their local political institutions and the regional historical territoriality that linked their atomized subsistence plots scattered across hacienda lands (*ibid.*; Findji and Rojas 1985). They carried out this effort "to recuperate ancestral lands in the Páez way—by working it" (Van Cott 1996), thus making the planting season a time of political activism.

Because of the centrality of hacienda production, the histories of non-indigenous peasant organizations and indigenous movements like the CRIC were intertwined since the 1960s (Findji 1992:118). Also, the movements' modern indigenous

> identity emerges out of a combination of the civic discourse that developed from the ruins of the leftist parties of the 1970s, the academic discourse of anthropologists who have studied the indigenous communities of Cauca, and the development discourse that claimed the attention of newly-empowered indigenous communities and organizations.

In this political sense, the Cauca resembles contemporary Chiapas as well as revolutionary Morelos. Most important for this essay, Findji points out that Indians' understanding of "territoriality" has evolved in the process of their historical struggle: "During the 1970s, indigenous struggles were most commonly read as a 'struggle for land'. In the 1980s, they started to be read as a 'struggle for territory'" (*ibid.*). The difference emerged as indigenous actors opposed to the official agrarian reform administration (INCORA, the Instituto Colombiano de Reforma Agraria) and its allies in the pioneering CRIC formed the Movimiento de Autoridades Indígenas del Cauca (MAIC) and became more aware of their historical rights. However, this development entailed a contradiction comparable to that between *indianista* and *campesinista* tendencies in Mexico:

> The growing importance of culture and tradition in the indigenous movement deepened the split between the ethnically organized *cabildos*, represented by AICO [Autoridades Indígenas de Colombia, linked to the MAIC], and the more pan-Indian, regionally based movement, headed by the CRIC, although the latter had always included cultural revindications in its program. The unity of the indigenous movement also is continuously challenged by the extreme isolation of many indigenous communities…(Van Cott 1996).

In the process of adopting a more historical and cultural approach to territoriality, Indians rediscovered links between their isolated plots of land and extensive chiefdoms (*cacicazgos*) already in place by the 18th century. These archival findings were "helpful in reconstructing the process of political unification through which the Páez people took shape" under colonial rule.[19]

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[19] Shadow (1985, 1987) documented a similar process in which the marginalized Tepecano people of the Gran Nayar region in Mexico discovered an extensive territory in their colonial titles.

Like Mexican movements that can easily beat the state at its game of finding roots in the ancient past, many of the Colombian studies stress the indigenous actors' serially "invented traditions" or indeed their repeatedly "reinvented past" (Rappaport 1990:187). Summarizing the Páez case, Rappaport (*ibid.:*183-84) points to

> the difficulties of diachronically defining the Páez as a social unit. Their territorial base has shifted in the course of the past 500 years. The nature of political units has been profoundly altered over the course of the centuries, and many of the political innovations embraced by the Páez are also shared by other indigenous communities. The population itself has grouped and regrouped, frequently with members of other ethnic units, whether they be Guambiano, Pijao or Guanacas. Many Páez no longer speak the aboriginal language, but continue to identify themselves with the ethnic group. Thus, the historical continuity that defines the Páez as a distinct social and cultural unit is more moral than actual, drawing its nourishment from an active historical tradition.… The source of the moral continuity that the Páez have always drawn with their past is born of the interpretation of key texts, most important among them being the *resguardo* titles written with the collaboration of Don Juan Tama.

In Rappaport's ethnohistorical study, territoriality emerges out of successive layers of meaning that a "textual community" ascribes to colonial land documents. The meanings are specifically bound to the places described in the titles, and power is exercised as "ritualized political practice performed across a landscape replete with mythic significance" (Gow and Rappaport 2000:18; *cf.* Liffman 2000 on the mythological and ceremonial associations of colonial boundary markers (*mojoneras*)).

Once the Colombian indigenous people organized their textually-based territorial reclamation, they also began to reclaim their *cabildos* (town councils) from corrupt *caciques* (Findji 1992: 119). Páez Indian *terrajeros* (hacienda tenant farmers) in particular sought to (re-)appropriate historical territory that linked their atomized subsistence plots scattered across hacienda lands (*ibid.*; Findji and Rojas 1985). They carried out this effort "to recuperate ancestral lands in the Páez way—by working it" (Van Cott 1996), thus making the planting season a time of political activism.

Already by the 1980s, new collective indigenous strategies had made INCORA policy recognize *resguardos* under *cabildo* control as legitimate subjects to receive grants of new lands and recognition of old ones. By 1992 (shortly after the new Colombian constitution had been drafted), 157 *resguardos* comprising nearly 19 million hectares (190,000 square kilometers or 47 million acres) had been established throughout the country (Findji 1992: 124).[20] The collective nature of indigenous citizenship in the *resguardos* parallels the amendment of Art. 4 of the Mexican constitution: "At the core of the Indigenous Authorities Movement's (MAIC's) struggle is the defense of the concept of the community as a guiding cultural model and alternative to the citizen—the plain, dispossessed individual of the large, crowded cities who is invited to 'participate' in power actually held by others" (130). The Colombian movement is thus opposed both to large private property and small private citizenship, a redefinition of political subjects emerging in Mexico as well (Rosaldo 1994).

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[20] In areas without officially recognized historical indigenous territoriality, the government set up *reservas* (somewhat comparable to Mexican revolutionary *ejidos*), which remained state rather than communal property.

Just as the original demands for land in the 70s changed into more inclusive historical-territorial demands in the 80s, in the 90s these in turn evolved into more strategic notions of indigenous identity, development and collective representation within the state:

> In post-Constitution [1991] Colombia, the indigenous movement has of necessity deviated from its original mission of land claims. Increasing state recognition of indigenous peoples as interlocutors, the administrative decentralization process cemented by the Constitution and the consolidation of indigenous lands slated for repossession by violent druglords have caused the movement to turn toward development as a means for carving out its economic autonomy in a pluralist world. But increasingly, this has entailed intensive reflection on what it means to be indigenous in the context of contemporary Colombia and the role of indigenous culture in this inevitable process of "development". This cultural politics of development accepts that different cultural meanings and practices come into conflict with each other, and that these meanings are part of a process that seeks to redefine development and the relations of social power in which this process is embedded (Alvarez, Dagnino and Escobar 1998).

Ultimately, "The reaffirmation of indigenous territoriality questioned not only the hacienda boundaries but the entire political-administrative order of the republic" (Findji 1992:127-28). Indeed, Rappaport has pointed out that as government multicultural empowerment programs seek to "shore up" a crumbling administrative system, the *cabildo* in effect has taken on state functions, (Lecture, University of Chicago Department of Anthropology, 1 April 2000). In turn, the *cabildo* has gone beyond being an administrative unit with a 1:1 relationship to a bounded territory since now *cabildos* are sometimes urban ethnic organizations, too. As Kearney (1996) indicated for Mexico, Rappaport signals that this also now problematizes the very notion that *indio* is a partial synonym for *campesino* (peasant).

3.2 Other regions in Colombia

Beyond the Cauca valley, the broader panorama of indigenous territorial claims in the mid-1990s was summarized by the indigenous leader Jesús Avirama, a member of the CRIC (1994:87):

> The emphasis of the struggle … differs at the level of the larger zones. For example, in the Amazon and the Llano, the struggle for natural resources and against colonization is most prominent. In the border areas, the idea of binationality and dual nationality has taken on considerable force. In the Andean region [including the Cauca valley] it is evident that the fundamental emphasis continues to be the recognition of *resguardos*. On the Pacific coast, the fundamental struggle is against the penetration of large corporations that, under the banner of "development", have been destroying the jungle and displacing the black and indigenous communities living in the region. Similarly, there are communities, such as the Arhuaco in the Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta, that fight principally for the maintenance of their religious beliefs and practices. Unfortunately, this effort has not been sufficient to impede the loss of their territory (1994:87)

Aside from the overwhelming importance of political struggle for constituting territory, see Romero 1995 for an sketch of the ceremonial exchange relationships that link indigenous territories in the Amazon and Orinoco watersheds of lowland Colombia. This article is one of two to deal with Colombia in a slim collection on the crisis of hunting and gathering peoples throughout Latin America (Bartolomé 1995). The other—Muñoz and Zambrano 1995—sketches the key actors in the creation of an indigenous *resguardo* in the jungle.

The most highly publicized recent territorial struggle in the Colombian Amazon is between Occidental Petroleum and the U'wa people, who threaten mass suicide if their land is destroyed for oil extraction. This has been tracked by Forests.org among others; *e.g.,* http://forests.org/recent/1999/uwaoccsi.htm, http://forests.org/archive/centamer/colindex.htm, and http://forests.org/archive/samerica/uwafigon.htm. Also, see http://www.nird.org/clic/Rrdl47.htm for a detailed FAO case study of Awá territoriality in the Colombian-Ecuadorian borderlands.

More generally, the vast literature on Amazonian cosmologies is clearly important for political territoriality. For one example, see Descola and Pálsson 1996, particularly Descola's article on animism, totemism and naturalism as epistemological modes of society-nature relations; Pálsson's article for three general models of human-environmental relations; and Århem's "eco-cosmological" (and functionalist) analysis of Makuna territoriality in the Colombian Amazon:

> This mythical mapping of the territory, which assigns to every named site and landmark a cosmological signification and mythical meaning, has far-reaching consequences for human resource use. Myths, in effect, are plans for land use—and extremely efficient ones since they are at once ecologically informed, emotionally charged and morally binding…a cosmology turned into ecology (1996:200).

Also see Viveiros de Castro's more theoretical piece (n.d.) comparing Amazonian and Western ontologies of the natural and social worlds.

For a summary discussion of the Pacific coastal area with its Black-Indian alliance, Grueso, Rosero and Escobar (1998:197) treat this movement's "ethno-cultural project" as a "negotiated elaboration of the law of cultural and territorial rights for the black communities (Law 70 of August 1993)". This "reflect[s] important formulations concerning the relation between territory, biodiversity, culture, and development". In other words, territorial control is centered on "biodiversity conservation, genetic resources, and the control and management of natural resources" (*ibid.:*209). It is assumed that this struggle will be "a real defense of the social and biophysical landscapes of the Pacific region". Such landscapes are thus grounded in both the phenomenology of place and in the political action required to save them: "cultural and ecological attachment to a territory, even as an attempt at creating new existential territories" (*ibid.:*213). Of course, territorial control is a highly contentious theme among minority populations strained by urban immigrants, government-funded global capitalist infrastructure development, top-down conservation regimes and drug cartels (*ibid.:*210). Indeed, Van Cott (1996) stresses that the Black-Indian alliance itself emerged only after continual Black-Indian conflict in the 1980s, and Blacks remain the distinctly less successful, junior partners.

Aside from outlining the main goals of the ostensible Black-Indian alliance, the Grueso, Rosero and Escobar article features the subaltern actors' own rich, albeit culturally and historically essentialized definitions of the key terms at stake in their struggle (and in this essay): "the right to territory (the right to space for being)…is a necessary condition for the re-creation and development of our cultural vision…where black people develop their being in harmony with nature". Elsewhere, territory is "a fundamental and multidimensional space for the creation and re-creation of the social, economic, and cultural values and practices of the communities…within a historical perspective linking past and future".

In this region, territoriality is organized in terms of watersheds, ascending forest strata and celestial/infraworld domains. It is rooted in a primeval and ongoing "autonomy (the right to the exercise of *being-identity*)…in relation to the dominant society, other ethnic groups, and political parties" (*ibid.:*203, 210). It is especially defined against "the developmentalist onslaught that forces the loss of knowledge, territory, and cultural practices and that reduces nature into a commodity" (*ibid.* 211). A more detailed study of identity construction in this area is in Kiran (1997) and one complex ethno-territorial system of the region is analyzed in Restrepo and del Valle (1996).

For all the diverse Colombian peoples indicated above by Jesús Avirama, struggles for territorial recognition and autonomy justify themselves in Law 152 (the Ley Orgánica del Plan de Desarrollo). Although somewhat vague, this measure institutionalizes the ideals of "autonomy, coordination, consistency, continuity, participation and sustainability" at various levels of governance. These include the indigenous *cabildo*, which is granted the right to determine its development regime according to *usos y costumbres* (Gow 1997: 249-250).

3.3 Ethno-development regimes in the Cauca region

Even within the Cauca region, with its overlapping indigenous groups, planning regimes are diverse. For instance, the Nasa or Páez are seen as traditional, sophisticated and preoccupied with specific local policy issues compared to the Guambianos (near Popayán) (Gow 1997:251,263). The Guambiano "Plan de Vida" is taken to be a model of community "thick description" and detailed, culturally specific development methodology, "a kind of metanarrative of indigenous planning" (*ibid.:*253). In the Guambianos' own terms:

> …we are aware that we are not an island, and that we cannot develop in isolation, that's impossible; we need to have links with other groups and other societies; we need the technical contribution, and we need science and serious studies and investigations which will help solve our problems, we need help and advice in all areas…

However, as quoted above in section 2.3, they insist on complete local over the development process (*ibid.:* 256).

Paradoxically, this leading development model has been formulated by a people whose prospects for territorial *recuperación*—even through outright purchase—have been severely limited since the 1990s. This is because nearby lands are occupied by other Indians and peasants or by Cali residents purportedly connected to drug lords, while the available highland *páramos* are unsuitable for cultivation. So, even though

regaining historical lands remains a key ethnic claim, territoriality has become less place-based and more tied to other forms of cultural reproduction. As has been signalled throughout this essay, the emergent pattern is deterritorialized indigenous development. As a result, the Guambiano Plan de Vida does not concretely tie historical territorial narrative into a "framework of conceptualizing new productive activities, administrative reorganization, or land claims strategies" (Gow & Rappaport 2000:30). Instead, land scarcity and other political realities have led Guambianos to create remote satellite parcels in historically alien areas and to rely more on opium cultivation (Gow 1997:259), a highly problematic path of "development". Drug cultivation is particularly associated with a decline in traditional agricultural activity and in the legitimacy of shamanistic and *cabildo* authority (*ibid.:*270; Gow & Rappaport 2000:26). At the same time, these communities attempt to institutionalize their vanishing traditions in school curricula, just as more generally globalization may paradoxically enhance an alienated people's primary territorial identifications.

     As noted above, the Nasa development schemes are said to be more limited, policy-oriented and particular to local communities instead of global and cultural like the Guambiano approach. They focus on health, education, infrastructure, housing, land tenure, agricultural production and activities, rather than a spiritually defined territoriality. Despite the different planning regimes, land shortage or the unsuitability of land for cultivation is a problem Nasas share with the Guambianos (Gow 1997:263). In fact, Nasas have barely a quarter of the territorial base they need for sustainable agriculture—cultivation that does not degrade the environment.

     This deterritorialization is especially grave for the Nasas who were displaced by a 1994 earthquake epicentered in the heart of their territory and by subsequent avalanches. They moved to an area around Sta. Leticia, which they named Juan Tama after their historical leader who wrote the land titles. Unfortunately the place is suitable only for livestock, an activity Nasas are historically unacquainted with (*ibid.:* 265-67). Although established as an "extension" of the original community, the new ecological situation and desperate economic conditions are leading to a territorial break and the establishment of a new communal identity (Gow and Rappaport 2000). This tendency has not been noted as frequently among Mexican indigenous outliers in the United States and Canada, who tend to maintain or even strengthen ties over distance, but it is comparable with the traumatic cultural shifts caused by hydroelectric development in Mexico.

     Other Nasa groups displaced by the 1994 earthquake, like the people from Tóez who were relocated near the city of Cali, have faced similar difficulties. Like the Guambianos, they are paradoxically emphasizing reindianization (linguistically, through craft production and especially in terms of education) amid continuing acculturation, land shortage, deterritorialization, opium production and individualization of formerly communal lands (Gow 1997:272,276; Gow & Rappaport 2000:9-12). For Findji and Rojas, in an analysis of local census data focusing on land tenure and labor organization in one *resguardo* (Jambaló, Cauca), the establishment of individual Unidades de Producción Doméstica (Domestic Production Units, UDPs) by subdividing larger communal units *generally* implies "the negation of …territoriality" as a space of social reproduction. This is because UDPs are identified with a (somewhat simplistically defined) "peasant economy" linked to "the economic expansion of the political territory of the nation-state". However, this individualization of formerly communal territories does not have to be at odds with collective values, as Netting (1993) also claimed for intensive cultivators in general. Findji and Rojas themselves

claim that UDPs *can* be reconciled with "communal forms of production and commercialization" and "a mode of settlement which is not restricted to the space of the [individual] parcel but which instead necessarily implies a territory" (1985:261).

Individualism is only one problem: in the indigenous people's words, "Violence has prevented the harmonious social project from following its course. As a result, the social reconstruction of Páez culture will be based on a rereading of history, culture, democracy, memory, and Páez thought" (quoted in Gow 1997:274). Indeed the rereading instrumentalizes tradition in order to solve social problems. This has apparent incongruities from a traditional anthropological point of view:

> With Tóez, the least ethnic and the most deindianized of all three [Nasa groups discussed], the community is making a deliberate effort to recover its culture, to preserve it, and to practice it, in the schools, in the homes, and in the marketplace. The justification lies not in the preservation of Nasa culture, but in its reinvention, as a means of dealing with modernity on their terms, neither indigenous nor deindianized, but as modern Nasa development, far from being viewed as a cause of culture loss, is explicitly seen as a means of cultural, and hence, ethnic survival (Gow 1997:277; *cf.* a broad, vociferous anthropological debate on identity politics, "authenticity" and anthropological authority summarized in Briggs 1996).

Gow and Rappaport pithily sum up this reinvention with the slogan of the CRIC: *"Tierra, Autonomía y Cultura":*

> *Tierra*–land—is a useful gloss for the creation of new post-earthquake Nasa communities; *autonomía*—autonomy, for the creation of indigenous special jurisdiction in the legal realm; and *cultura*—culture, a constructive metaphor for understanding the objectives of community-inspired development (Gow & Rappaport 2000:5).

In both Mexico and Colombia, then, the redefinition of territoriality as an autonomous development regime is a notable evolution from the focus on land per se or on territoriality in a more cultural sense just a few years ago. It is essentially a reappropriation of state *indigenista* development schemes by emergent indigenous regional worlds.